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ABSTRACT
Noddings’ theory of caring, which is nearing its 35th anniversary, 
has failed to garner the attention of the more classical theories of 
ethics.  This slight may be due to its relative youth, or the histori-
cal support for other constructs, but if examined through the lens of 
evolutionary biology, the validity of Noddings might be tested.  Us-
ing recent discoveries from the emerging fields of cognitive ethology 
and neuroscience, I have evaluated whether there exists evolution-
ary underpinnings for her theory. My analysis makes it apparent that 
the empathy and altruism required for the practice of caring are as 
much a product of our natural instincts as are our selfish tendencies. 
Armed with this information, one must draw the conclusion that the 
ethic of caring, unlike other ethical theories, is not grounded in a 
cultural construct of what is right but in a natural one. 
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Introduction
When she first proposed her theory of caring, Noddings rec-
ognized that in all previous iterations of ethical theory, “human 
caring and the memory of being cared for…have not received 
attention except as outcomes of ethical behavior” because “eth-
ics, the philosophical study of morality, [had] concentrated…
on moral reasoning” (Noddings 2003, 1).  In her mind, this 
was because all previous theories had been approached from a 
masculine perspective; to ground ethics not in rules but in car-
ing was to feminize it…or so she thought.  She actually came 
to be the harbinger for the results of three decades of research 
in social psychology, cognitive neuroscience and ethology that 
explain the evolutionary origins of empathy and provided a 
portent for the re-emergence of group selection as a viable hy-
pothesis to explain altruism and justice.  What follows is an 
explanation of why Noddings’ theory of caring should take its 
proper place as foundational for the study of ethics in the natu-
ral and educated world.
Not Just a Theory, but a Theory
Grounded in the relationship between the one-caring and 
the cared for (the two will henceforth not be italicized), Nod-
dings explains that, according to the theory of caring, all ethi-
cal conduct is grounded in the interpersonal dynamic between 
the aforementioned dyad.  According to Noddings, “caring in-
volves, for the one-caring, a ‘feeling with’ the other” (Noddings 
2003, 30).  It is to act “not by fixed rule but by affection and 
regard” (24), and to allow the “cared for [to] ‘grow’ and ‘glow’ 
under the perceived attitude of the one-caring” (67).  Without 
the fixed rules present in other ethical theories, some have ar-
gued that caring carries with it an ambiguity that prevents it 
from providing clear guidance with regard to ethical action 
(Rachels 1999). Noddings, however, determines that the one-
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caring’s actions serve as “the foundation of—and not a mere 
manifestation of—her morality” (42).  In what could seem like 
an echo of deontological ethics, the one caring acts from “A 
sense that ‘I must’ do something … ” (Noddings 2002, 13). 
At times when there is internal resistance, we must “ … ask 
ourselves how we would behave if this other were pleasanter or 
were someone we loved, if we were not tired, if the need were 
not so great” (Noddings 2002, 13). Caring thus becomes an 
ethical act that, unlike duty ethics, is not rational but relational. 
And, “A relational interpretation of caring pushes us to look 
not only at moral agents but also at the recipients of their acts 
and the conditions under which the parties interact” (Noddings 
2002, 14). Therefore, the relationship is not simply the product 
of the innate existence of some ethical system; rather Noddings 
sees the relationship as the ethic.
The evolutionary roots of this capacity for dyadic caring 
run quite deep.  Cooperative and affilliative behaviors exist in 
both invertebrate and vertebrate taxa, being observed in ani-
mals ranging from ants, to birds, to primates (Wilson 1975). 
Because cooperation has been identified as adaptive in many 
mammals, it should not be surprising that there exists positive 
feedback for engaging in such behavior—delivered in the form 
of opioids—in the reward centers of the brain (Rilling et al. 
2002).  It has been suggested these neural pathways serve as 
the biochemical basis for the development of trust between two 
individuals (Bekoff and Pierce 2009).  With trust having been 
identified as necessary for social cooperation (Axelrod and 
Hamilton 1981), the rudiments of caring likely exist in most 
if not all mammals (Bekoff and Pierce 2009) and at least some 
birds (Marzluff and Angell, 2013).
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Caring, in Noddings’ estimation however, requires more 
than cooperation—it requires empathy.  Though the capacity 
for empathy in non-humans had been intimated for decades 
(De Waal 2009), it was not until the discovery of mirror neu-
rons that there existed a physiological basis for its exhibition 
(Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, and Rizzolatti 1996). These cells are 
activated when an individual is watching what a conspecific 
does, producing the same neural excitation within the individu-
al as if she were doing it herself (Gazzaniga 2009).  This neural 
stimulation means that, in many ways, one feels as if she is on 
the high-wire with the acrobat despite standing several hun-
dred feet below, even as she rests comfortably on solid ground 
(De Waal 2009).  Humans almost certainly share this capacity 
not only with other primates, but also with birds (Keysers and 
Gazzola, 2009). Recent ethological studies suggest that this ca-
pacity may even extend to a broad taxonomic base that also 
includes rodents, elephants, dogs, cetaceans, and even cepha-
lopods (Bonini and Ferrari 2011).
The ability to share experiences through an emotional con-
nection is to exhibit empathy, but it can be done to varying 
degrees.  The most basal of these exhibitions is through an 
emotional contagion like fear, which can be shared by conspe-
cifics and heterospecifics alike and has been identified both in 
birds and mammals (Bekoff and Pierce 2009), as well as eu-
social insects (E.O. Wilson 1975).  The sharing of fear does 
not necessarily require mirror neurons, for it may be detected 
through auditory, chemical, or tactile stimuli, but for an input 
that doesn’t immediately activate the limbic system, these spe-
cialized cells are likely necessary to elicit such a response.  It 
has therefore been suggested that the contagiousness of an act 
like yawning is a product of mirror neurons and an exhibition 
of proto-empathy (Anderson, Myowa‚ Yamakoshi, and Mat-
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suzawa 2004), and has been observed in a variety of primate 
families (De Waal 2009), and even, arguably, in domestic dogs 
(Madsden and Persson 2013).  This connectedness can be ex-
tended into times of emotional distress, allowing an individual 
to “feel sorry for” another (Bekoff and Pierce 2009). Consid-
ered in humans to be the “misery loves company” effect, it 
has been documented that people who are sad are apt to seek 
out social contact (Gray, Ishii, and Ambady 2011) and that sur-
rounding oneself with people who are exhibiting similar feel-
ings of depression can alleviate its effects (Gibbons 1986).  In 
this context, emotional empathy in both humans and non-hu-
mans is adaptive, serving as a rudimentary form of caring.
Yet Noddings’ vision of caring involves two distinct roles, 
the one-caring and the cared for, suggesting that a difference 
exists in expectations and actions.  So, while there are times 
when utilization of empathy may be all the one-caring has to 
exhibit in order to satisfy the needs of the cared for, Noddings 
explains that this often isn’t the case.  The one-caring should 
not be seen acting in a consistent rule-bound fashion; rather, 
“variation is to be expected…for her engrossment is in the 
variable and never fully understood other” (Noddings 2003, 
24).  The ethical expectation is that the one caring “ … ideally 
acts in direct response to the needs of the cared-for. When this 
impulse toward natural caring fails, a carer draws on her own 
ideal of herself as a carer. [She asks] How would I act if I were 
at my caring best?” (Noddings 2002, 8). True caring, Nod-
dings would argue, moves beyond empathy and into sympathy, 
whereby the one-caring is able to internalize what the cared-for 
needs and attempt to provide it. 
The initial behavior associated with sympathy—observers 
approaching a victim before they know what is going on—has 
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been identified both by Noddings and de Waal (2009).  While 
the former articulates it as “the apprehension of…misery in 
others” (Noddings 2003, 51), the latter considers the behavior 
an evolutionary exhibition of pre-concern, for it exists in many 
social mammals, even some that fail to possess mirror neurons 
(De Waal 2009).  It can be argued that it is because of this ca-
pacity that dogs are considered man’s best friend, for whether 
it is a pack-mate, a playmate, or an human owner, canids share 
a predilection to gravitate towards and provide comfort to the 
loser of a bout (Cools, Van Hout, and Nelissen 2008).  Because 
these actions are instinctual, however, the aforementioned be-
havior fails to approach what is widely considered to be true 
sympathy, that which is exhibited by humans and is required 
for Noddings’ theory of caring.  For true sympathy to occur, 
there needs to exist the ability of an individual to take anoth-
er’s perspective; they must possess a theory of mind (de Waal 
2009).
When one is wont to attribute a theory of mind to a mem-
ber of a species, the authors of the first investigation of the 
phenomena state that it requires that an “individual imputes 
mental states to himself and to others” (Premack and Wood-
ruff 1978, 515).  Viewed in this light, it has been identified 
that the ability to take into account another’s perspective ex-
ists not only in apes (Call and Tomasello 2008) and monkeys 
(Kummer, Anzenberger, and Hemelrijk 1996), but also in dogs 
(Maginnity 2007) and the “brainiest” group of birds, the cor-
vids (Bugnyar and Heinrich 2005; Dally, Emery, and Clayton 
2006).  Noddings explains that such perspective taking allows 
the one-caring to observe a situation with her own eyes and 
with those of the cared for.  Cognitive neurologists have linked 
an increase in this capacity to the possession of Von Economo 
neurons (VEN), also know as spindle cells (de Waal 2009). 
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These specialized neurons have been identified in apes (the 
taxonomic group of which humans are a part), cetaceans (i.e. 
dolphins and whales), and elephants (Bekoff and Pierce 2009).
The enhanced ability to internalize another’s perspective 
manifests itself in the most advanced form of caring—targeted 
helping.  Defined as “assistance geared toward another’s spe-
cific situation or need” (de Waal 2009, 92), targeted helping has 
been exhibited in a variety of species. Ranging from an ape at 
a zoo collecting a stunned starling in her enclosure, ascending 
the tallest tree, and spreading the bird’s wings before throwing 
it to freedom (de Waal 2006, 2) to wild elephants providing 
dying companions with the resources they perceived necessary 
to keep their conspecifics alive (de Waal 2009, 133), targeted 
helping is what defines Noddings’ theory of caring, and dif-
ferentiates it from other systems of ethics. 
Rather than being grounded in the abstraction of rules and 
the multiple layers of principles that construct the classical—
and as she identifies them, traditionally masculine—theories of 
ethics, caring is grounded within the neurological framework 
constructed through evolutionary processes to facilitate the 
interpersonal relationships between individuals of big-brained 
social species.  Noddings is careful to note that, though “ … 
care theory has its practical roots in women’s history and tra-
ditions,” she has “ … no idea whether women are, by nature, 
more caring than men” (Noddings 2002, 10). She notes the fre-
quently made observation that “there seem to be inclinations 
or fairly regular tendencies that are gender related, but it is not 
unreasonable to attribute these to centuries of experience and 
social expectations” (Noddings 2006, 233). The theory, there-
fore, is not an essentialist one. Instead, it is an ethic that “ … 
may be regarded as a form of pragmatic naturalism. It does not 
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posit a source of moral life beyond actual human interaction” 
(Noddings 2002, 15).  Since the ethic’s foundation lay in caring 
interactions, its development requires “ … studying the tradi-
tion of care that has been so much a part of women’s history” 
(Noddings 2002, 10). 
In each interaction, one individual is foisted into the role 
as either the one-caring (i.e. the deliverer of empathy, sympa-
thy, or targeted help), or the one who is cared for.  These roles, 
particularly that of the cared-for, put individuals into posi-
tions where the other participant might expect reciprocity.  For 
Noddings, this is delivered in some form of response by the 
cared-for, either by flourishing under the watchful eye of the 
one-caring or sharing their experiences (or both).  This is not 
a burden to the cared for, “because the cared for is free to be 
more fully himself in the caring relation” (Noddings 2003, 73). 
This is not the case when viewing the expectation of reciproc-
ity from a more traditional ethical perspective.  Viewed from 
the framework of virtue ethics, where reciprocity serves as a 
theoretical pillar (Putnam 1988), it is a burden, because, ac-
cording to Becker (1986, 74)—an authority on the subject of 
reciprocation—“we ought to be disposed, as a matter of moral 
character, to make reciprocity a moral obligation.”  Reciproc-
ity, then, seemingly exists both in the abstract as a principle in 
classical ethics framework, and in the concrete as a part of a 
relationship in Noddings’ ethic of caring.
Group Selection Acting on the Individual
Were one to distill both versions of reciprocity down to a 
single articulated rule, the origin of both becomes plain.  In the 
more classical version, reciprocity manifests itself as the gold-
en rule: do unto others as you would have done to you.  This 
is represents Kant’s categorical imperative (Kant 1965) and is 
Walter Jason Niedermeyer
193
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 22, Issue 1
the centerpiece of the duty ethics framework.  The reciproc-
ity sought in the ethic of caring is different. Noddings (2002) 
writes, “Contrary to Kant, who insisted that each person’s 
moral perfection is his or her own project, we remain at least 
partly responsible for the moral development of each person 
we encounter” (15). For Noddings’ theory, reciprocity instead 
manifests itself as do unto others as they need done to them. 
Viewed in these forms, the former version of reciprocity (from 
either the perspective of virtue or duty ethics) is a self-centered 
one, aligning itself, at the most basal level, with the biological 
version of reciprocity, whereby individuals in a society are not 
expected to take another’s perspective as they engage in a form 
of quid pro quo (Ridley 1996).  Noddings’ take, therefore, devi-
ates from typical biological reciprocity.  Rather than being built 
from a position of selfishness, it is constructed from a position 
of selflessness, making it an act of altruism. This distinction 
explains why Noddings (2002) declares,
… at bottom, the ethic of care should not be thought of 
as an ethic of virtue. Certainly, people who care in giv-
en situations exercise virtues, but if they begin to con-
centrate on their own character or virtue, the cared-for 
may feel put off. The cared-for is no longer the focus of 
attention. Rather, a virtue—being patient, or generous, 
or cheerful—has become the focus, and the relation of 
caring itself becomes at risk. (14)
It should therefore not be surprising that these perspectives 
on reciprocity are, at times, in diametric opposition because 
they are the products of processes that are, at times, in diamet-
ric opposition: individual selection and group selection.  
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In a social species, the processes of individual selection 
cause an individual to seek status due to the privileges that are 
associated with its acquisition.  These privileges most often al-
low the individual with status access to preferential resources 
(Wilson 1975), including food (de Waal 2006) and mates (Rid-
ley 1993).  This correlation between status and privilege gener-
ates a justifiable sense of entitlement for each distinguishable 
status level, leaving individuals with an aversion to inequity 
(Brosnan and de Waal 2003).  This compulsion to “get what 
one deserves” provides the foundation of the American sense 
of fairness (de Waal 2009), which, according to the renowned 
moral and political philosopher Rawls (1999), is what defines 
justice.  In order to facilitate this in groups, rules must exist, 
be they the unwritten ones of non-humans (Bekoff and Pierce 
2009) or those clearly stipulated by a constitution (Rawls 2003). 
The utilization of such rules allows for a clear delineation for 
ascension in the hierarchy—but it also provides a system that 
can be cheated.  The existence of such freeloaders requires that 
enforcers exist to monitor individuals’ adherence to the sys-
tem.  Performing police duties has benefits to more than just 
the group—individuals who punish transgressors attempting 
to illicitly acquire status are granted status themselves (Wil-
son 2007).  Due to the nature of their positions, however, such 
deputies are unable to achieve the ultimate in privileges, and 
thus are faced with a conundrum: work within the system and 
remain relegated to secondary status, or step outside of it in 
order to acquire more power?
In chimpanzees that were living at the Arnhem zoo, one 
possible answer to this question played out before the eminent 
primatologist Frans de Waal.  As the story goes, Luit, “the most 
magnificent chimpanzee male I have known, both in body and 
spirit” (2006, 44), had ascended to the status of alpha male. 
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This had been achieved because of his physical dominance 
over any individual chimpanzee and the strategic maneuver 
of supporting winners during internecine conflict during his 
meteoric rise before becoming an arbiter for all disputes once 
he had become alpha.  The cunning previously deposed leader, 
Yeroen, made it plain he was unsatisfied with his demotion, 
and he quickly formed an alliance with Nikkie, an oafish brute. 
Together, their alliance was able to overthrow Luit and the pair 
was able to maintain their position for four years.  In their dy-
adic coalition, Nikkie was granted the privileges befitting a 
lone alpha in every arena save one—in the access to mates. 
In this respect, Yeroen was granted a disproportionately large 
number of copulations.  It was a classic exhibition of biologi-
cal reciprocity whereby each participant had selfishly acquired 
that which he wanted and thought he deserved (de Waal 2006). 
The arrangement, however, was eventually deemed unsat-
isfactory by Nikkie, who both began to deny Yeroen access 
to females, and stopped supporting him in spats with Luit.  In 
some instances, Nikkie even joined Luit in removing Yeroen 
from a female.  Yeroen’s frustration led to several attacks on 
Nikkie, and thus their tightly knit bond began to unravel, al-
lowing Luit to return to his “rightful” position as alpha male 
(de Waal 2006).
The aforementioned scenario includes what some would 
consider significant anthropomorphizing, but it was used be-
cause this scenario could very easily have played out in humans 
rather than chimpanzees.  In fact, it essentially was played out 
during the War of the Roses.  Matt Ridley (1996) relays his 
recognition of the similarity thusly:
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Then it dawned on me.  Margaret of Anjou, the queen 
of England, was Luit.  Edward IV, the usurper son of 
the Duke of York, was Nikkie, and the wealthy earl 
known as Warwick the Kingmaker was Yeroen.  Con-
sider: with Warwick’s help, the Duke of York toppled 
the incompetent hen-pecked Henry VI.  After York 
was killed, his son, Edward IV became king, but ner-
vous of Warwick’s power allowed his wife’s family to 
build up a rival faction at court to undermine Warwick.  
An increasingly disenchanted Warwick formed an al-
liance with Henry VI’s wife, Margaret of Anjou, drove 
Edward into exile and seized back the throne for his 
new puppet, the bewildered Henry VI.  But Edward 
successfully fomented rebellion against Warwick, 
killed him in battle, captured London and had Henry 
VI murdered.  It is almost the same story as Luit, Nik-
kie and Yeroen.  At Arnhem, Luit, too, was eventually 
killed, by Yeroen. (159)
For both humans and chimpanzees, the story seems to be the 
same: the allure of access as an individual to more and better 
resources is too great to be overcome by the imposition of rules 
for reciprocity, regardless of whether they derive from a sense 
of duty, a set of virtues, or the prescription of law.
Noddings’ perspective on reciprocity as a product of altru-
ism (“do unto others as they need done to them”) leads to a 
different expectation of how fairness should manifest itself in 
society; it will lead to the cared for receiving care from the 
one-caring.  Observed in practice within a society, this type 
of fairness has been referred to as decidedly “European,” re-
sulting in the redistribution of wealth to ensure that each in-
dividual has equal (i.e. fair) access to the services needed to 
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help her thrive (de Waal 2009). This manifestation of caring 
fairness is seemingly at odds with the polygamous nature of 
our ancestral mating systems where status mattered (Gavrilets, 
2012), particularly in light of the fact that individuals who are 
considered to be kind—and therefore more likely to engage in 
altruistic acts—are less likely to be considered for positions of 
high status, regardless of gender (Haslam and Reicher 2012).
What the existence of caring fairness on a societal level does 
suggest, however, is that not only do females have an inclina-
tion to engage in altruism, but so do males. This predisposition 
to care by the male may, surprisingly, have its origins in the 
very polygamous mating system that should stifle the desire. 
It has recently been hypothesized that the behavioral change 
from a highly competitive, harem-based mating system to that 
of the pair-bonding that characterizes modern human repro-
duction was the product of less physical males provisioning 
a female with meat acquired during a hunt (Gavrilets 2012). 
Because meat is difficult to come by for most primates (King 
1980), giving up such a rarity is to the detriment of the giver—
the one caring—suggesting it is an act of altruism (de Waal 
2009).  Such behavior may therefore be the product of an innate 
caring instinct.  
It could also be supposed, however, that the behavior is the 
product of the classical version of reciprocity.  The sharing of 
food with the opposite gender may be a product of our ancestry, 
for it has been documented that chimpanzee females mate more 
frequently with the males that provide them with food (Gomes 
and Boesch 2009), and, when between-gender food sharing 
by humans is seen in public, there is a similar presumption of 
sexual intimacy (Miller, Rozin, and Fiske 1998).  Taken in this 
way, the provisioning of food and its facilitation of the devel-
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opment of pair-bonding could just be seen as another way of 
beating the system. There is circumstantial evidence, however, 
that even if the initial impetus behind such courtship feeds in 
humans is selfish, it may inspire a caring relationship. In her 
book, Mothers and Others, Sarah Hrdy (2011) describes how in 
some cultures, women will have sanctioned extramarital cou-
plings that can result in partial paternity, with children thought 
to be the offspring of all of the men who may potentially be 
the father. These men then care for not only the child when 
it is born, but also the mother when she is pregnant.  Though 
similar behavior has been observed across various cultures, it 
is far from universal. And even if it were, it would be difficult 
to argue that the behavior was not selfish, as men may have 
simply been taking actions to protect their genetic interests. 
This possibility, paired with the theoretical nature of Gavrilets’ 
(2012) study, makes it impossible to discern whether these are 
empirical instances of the caring ethic in action.  In order to 
make a stronger claim for the natural inclination to care, there 
must exist empirical and observational data on species with 
common ancestry whereby reciprocity exists in the form of al-
truism.
The Caring Primate(s)
Anecdotes exist from credible ethologists of individuals pro-
viding not only targeted help in a fashion marginally detrimen-
tal to their well-being, but also of risking their lives and suf-
fering harm in the course of helping others (de Waal 2009). To 
make the claim that the ethic of care is the natural framework 
from which humans work, however, a society of caring must 
be identified in some of our closest living relatives. And such 
a society seems to exist in bonobos, the pygmy chimpanzee.  
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As opposed to the common chimpanzee, whose societies are 
structured around male-dominance, bonobo social structure is 
decidedly matriarchal (Sapolsky 2006) and much more egali-
tarian (de Waal 2006).  This discovery certainly aligns with 
the cross-cultural narrative Noddings (2006) observed that has 
“femininity … defined in terms of subservience and masculin-
ity in terms of the manliness of the warriors” (234). Perhaps 
that would lead Noddings to say that their radically different 
social organization, layered on top of even slight gender dif-
ferences, predisposes bonobos to caring. What is known is the 
existence of significantly stronger bonds in both female-female 
and male-female bonobo relationships as compared to com-
mon chimpanzees.  These relationships are likely bolstered by 
the fact that conflict resolution does not occur with violence 
in bonobo society but through sex, both within and between 
genders.  That there is decidedly less musculature in bonobos 
than common chimpanzees provides evidence that this form of 
reconciliation has been in existence for a long period of time 
(de Waal 2006).  Might this also suggest that bonobos are a spe-
cies whose societies are built on caring?  
Because sex serves as the centerpiece of reciprocity that ex-
ists in bonobo society, one could argue that it may simply be an 
example of an extremely intimate form of quid pro quo.  One 
could also argue that, with bonobo societies made up largely 
of related males and unrelated females (de Waal 2006), the low 
levels of violence are a product of kin selection (Silk 2006). 
This would also explain that, given the desire for sex and pa-
ternity that exists in males, with the former so freely provided 
that it muddles the certainty of the latter, males are unlikely to 
commit infanticide if there is even a chance the offspring is his 
own—or his brother’s (Hrdy 1999). 
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So, whether the reciprocity that exists in bonobos is the 
product of being selfish or selfless, in either case, the recipro-
cal nature of bonobo culture is most probably due to genetic 
and not cultural evolution.  Therefore, were this to be an mani-
festation of Noddings’ caring, all it would illustrate is that in 
one species natural selection produced an ethic of caring.  For 
caring to be considered natural in humans, it would therefore 
have to be paraphyletic, with exhibitions in species possess-
ing a more basal common ancestor with humans.  And though 
the rudiments of caring culture—social groups with patterns 
of exhibiting altruism—have been observed in a wide vari-
ety of other animals, most of the data and observations come 
from primates (Cronin 2012; de Waal 2009; Stevens and Gilby 
2004).  These include the best (or most well-described) case of 
a culture that has almost certainly evolved to care.  
Savannah baboons exist in complex societies structured 
largely around male dominance hierarchies (Sapolsky 2002). 
In order to achieve dominance, a male must engage in violent 
physical exchanges—though like with Gavrilets’ (2012) model 
for humans, there exist a variety of mating strategies that allow 
males of lower rank to achieve copulations (Bercovitch 1986). 
This provides the first indication that some inclination towards 
a caring form of reciprocity may exist in savannah baboons. 
The existing division in mating tactics between males within 
a troop manifests itself in other circumstances—those that are 
combative (and therefore dominant) are less likely to be social 
(Sapolsky 2006) and more likely to act boldly when presented 
with a unique opportunity (Wilson 2007).  When a troop of 
savannah baboons next to a heavily studied group (The “For-
est Troop”) were provided with an unexpected foraging oppor-
tunity—the creation of a dump in their territory—the boldest 
individuals were rewarded in this omnivorous species.  
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With an abundance of now easily available protein in the 
form of thrown away meat, males in the “Garbage Dump 
Troop” who elected to battle each other for access to the food 
were living the proverbial high life—until the bacteria re-
sponsible for primate tuberculosis came to reside on the meat. 
Once the fast spreading disease infected the group, all of its 
members died, along with the males in the neighboring “For-
est Troop” bold enough to cross territory lines and feed at the 
dump.  Sapolsky, the troop’s lead researcher, noted a significant 
change in the group dynamics in the aftermath of the outbreak.
The social consequences of these changes were dra-
matic. There remained a hierarchy among the Forest 
Troop males, but it was far looser than before: com-
pared with other, more typical savanna baboon groups, 
high-ranking males rarely harassed subordinates and 
occasionally even relinquished contested resources 
to them. Aggression was less frequent, particularly 
against third parties. And rates of affiliative behaviors, 
such as males and females grooming each other or sit-
ting together, soared. There were even instances, now 
and then, of adult males grooming each other -- a be-
havior nearly as unprecedented as baboons sprouting 
wings. (Sapolsky 2006, 108)
As with the predictions made by Gavrilets (2012), male 
and female baboons exhibiting a group selected sense of car-
ing fairness could, under certain circumstances, out-compete 
those grounded in an individually selected sense of deserving 
fairness.  Yet with the possibility of this being an anomaly that 
was simply the product of an unlikely epidemic whereby low-
ranking individuals were simply left with a form of low-status 
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quid pro quo, is there anything that can be said about the rela-
tive sustainability and transferability of this group’s behavior?
With males as the gender dispersing from the group upon 
adolescence to avoid inbreeding (Sapolsky 2002), in order for 
the reconstituted “Forest Troop” to maintain its decidedly dif-
ferent ethos, it has had to incorporate members coming from 
troops that are more traditional.  In these troops, males would 
have been exposed to significant violence both through obser-
vation and experience, and therefore would likely exhibit simi-
larly aggressive behaviors themselves.  Somehow, the troop 
successfully managed to enculture the new members, even in 
the absence of teaching (Sapolsky 2006).  While the possibility 
exists that this is a product of their mirror neurons and instinct 
for mimicry (Palagi, Leone, Mancini, and Ferrari 2009), Sapol-
sky thinks otherwise.
To date, the most interesting hint about the mechanism 
of transmission is the way recently transferred males 
are treated by Forest Troop’s resident females. In a 
typical savanna baboon troop, newly transferred ado-
lescent males spend years slowly working their way 
into the social fabric; they are extremely low ranking 
-- ignored by females and noted by adult males only as 
convenient targets for aggression. In Forest Troop, by 
contrast, new male transfers are inundated with female 
attention soon after their arrival…Furthermore, these 
welcoming gestures occur more frequently in Forest 
Troop during the early post-transfer period, and there 
is four times as much grooming of males by females in 
Forest Troop as elsewhere. From almost the moment 
they arrive, in other words, new males find out that 
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in Forest Troop, things are done differently. (Sapolsky 
2006, 109)
With no apparent benefit to the females, and with transferred 
males receiving exactly what they need when they need it, this 
finding suggests that the cared fors were receiving care from 
the ones-caring.  Noddings would find this society to epitomize 
the ethic of caring, for it manifests itself in a culture derived 
from a natural inclination towards those that need attention.  It 
contains no set of written rules, no sense of entitlement, and 
no need for immediate reciprocation; the only edict is a natural 
one, whereby the one caring feels compelled to (i.e. Noddings’ 
sense of “I must”) assist the cared for.  It is the exhibition of 
altruism not by a lone individual but by a group, because mil-
lions of years of group selection have produced a predilection 
to care.
Maintaining the Culture of Caring
Though, as illustrated above, the instinct to care in humans 
and other higher primates likely has a genetic basis, the way 
it manifests and, possibly more importantly, maintains itself 
is the product of culture.  In non-human apes, this is often 
achieved through different methods of grooming (Bonnie and 
de Waal 2006; Nakamura and Uehara 2004), which is both an 
act of altruism and one of the rites of affiliation.  In humans, 
whose groups are naturally much larger (Dunbar 1993) and 
whose culture is both imitated with extremely high fidelity 
(Lyons, Damrosch, Lin, Macris, and Keil 2011) and advanced 
through the uniquely human capacity to “ratchet” (i.e. improve 
upon or advance) ideas (Whiten 2011), one of the most success-
ful cultural constructs for maintaining the ideal of caring has 
consistently been religion.
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As noted by David Sloan Wilson (2003; 2007), religions 
around the world have both an “upward” and an “outward” 
component.  For an evolutionary biologist, these align with 
the proximate and ultimate causes for religion respectively. 
Viewed thusly, the “upward” component, providing a relation-
ship with a higher power and (in most religions) the promise of 
eternity in exchange for leading a just life, is what facilitates 
the “outward” component—it brings people together (Wilson 
2007).  Viewed from a the perspective of a social scientist, this 
take might be identified as decidedly functionalist (Durkheim, 
Cosman, and Cladis 2001), an idea that has fallen out of favor 
in the last fifty years (Wilson 2003).  This is largely thanks to 
Evans-Pritchard (1956; 1965) who, with the help of his con-
temporaries, systematically studied the religions of “primitive” 
nations and concluded that a great many of the native people’s 
religiously motivated (i.e. “upward”) practices were irrational, 
and thereby non-functional—from the researchers’ perspec-
tive.  When examined for how adaptive each religion’s tenets 
were for groups based on their local environment and cultural 
history, it was discovered that the design of the religion of-
ten succeeded in its ultimate (i.e. “outward”) goal—it brought 
people together (Wilson 2003; 2007), and in a fashion that put 
them in a position to care for one another.
 Religions were therefore able to promote caring because 
they discouraged any tendencies towards selfish behaviors that 
arose from localized conditions.  And with environmental and 
societal pressures ever changing, the most successful cultural 
adaptations were not those that were imposed from above but 
those that emerged through the natural course of group living 
(Ridley 2010; Vermeij 2006).  This recognition explains why 
most of the religions that have ever existed on the planet have 
either disappeared or dramatically changed since their incep-
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tion (Wilson 2003).  Because their ultimate goal is to bring 
people together, any religion that begins to fail to meet those 
ends must either respond by adapting its practices or face ex-
tinction.  As Noddings (2002) describes it, the caring ethic “ 
… does not depend on gods, or eternal verities …” but on “ … 
an ethical ideal constituted from memories of caring and being 
cared for” (15). That some religions have been able to grow 
their membership across cultures and continents is therefore 
less a testament to the divine theological ethic imbued within 
its practices, and more to their ultimate mission: to bring peo-
ple together so they can care for one another.   
Whether one subscribes to a framework of virtue, duty, or 
religious ethics, all are a response to an individual’s natural 
inclination to act selfishly.  Only Noddings’ ethic of caring ex-
ists because of a natural tendency—to act altruistically.  For 
this reason, while the other ethics may change based on time, 
people, and place, caring will live on in our species and others, 
for it may be the only natural ethic. 
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